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Abstract:  
Shame is a complex emotion and often discussed with reluctance; these feelings are 
usually incapacitating and unbearable. In this paper, the aim is to review our 
understanding of shame. The paper highlights recent empirical findings in order to 
define shame and explore its different aspects and characteristics such as its 
development, its occurrence and its different forms and shapes. Furthermore, it 
identifies differences between shame and similar affective experiences such as guilt and 
embarrassment and takes a closer look at shame in different cultures and contexts.  
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Introduction 
 
Shame is notoriously unpleasant emotion that almost all of us have experienced at least 
once in our lifetimes. Almost everyone knows what the feeling of shame is like. 
However, we are reluctant to disclose our shameful experiences. It is often mentioned 
that shame is a taboo subject (Brown, 2010). Ironically, we are ashamed of our shame. It 
seems to be much easier to say that ‚I am angry/sad/nervous‛ than to say ‚I am ashamed.” 
Rather than finding it liberating, there is an assumption that talking about shame is 
demeaning, or is a sign of weakness. Therefore, until recently, there has been a dearth of 
research, understanding, and knowledge about shame, to the extent that shame and 
similar emotions, such as guilt, are used interchangeably in the literature.  
 Since shame appears to be present in a wide variety of psychological disorders 
and is associated with mental health problems such as depression, social phobia, and 
eating disorders, it is necessary to extend our knowledge in this area, and to become 
well-equipped to deal with shame.  
 The overarching purpose of this paper is to present an overview of shame, and 
explores the nature and main features thereof. This paper has been divided into three 
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sections: understanding of shame, differentiation of shame from similar constructs, and 
associations between shame, culture, and gender.   
 
1. Understanding of Shame 
 
  ‚The feeling you get as a result of doing or thinking something you believe to be bad or 
 immoral. It can also come from a fear of others finding out what you’ve done.” 
 
 ‚Embarrassment or the feeling of being annoyed at yourself. I would describe it as 
 disappointment.” 
 
 ‚I would describe shame as an emotion of particular ridicule or a sense of diverging from 
 the social norm, i.e. not fitting into the world, being particularly different from what is 
 socially accepted and exposed as such.” 
 
 ‚When you feel as though you have done something bad to someone else you know. When 
 you can’t look at someone in the eye.”  
 
 These are a few examples of how students at our university, largely unfamiliar 
with psychology, described shame. Like these students, I also find it very difficult to 
define shame. From my personal experience, I can say that shame is an overwhelmingly 
negative emotion. Feelings of shame make me feel insignificant and inferior. When I 
feel shame, I wish the ground would swallow me up. I wish I could be invisible and not 
be noticed. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, shame is: ‚The painful emotion 
arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s 
own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or disgrace one regards as 
one’s own), or of being in a situation which offends one’s sense of modesty or decency‛ (OED 
online, December, 2014).  
 The current shame theorists and the empirical research suggest that shame is one 
of the so-called self-conscious emotions (M. Lewis, 1992), because it mainly involves an 
evaluation of the self. Shame is believed to be an incapacitating emotion that is 
accompanied by the feeling of being small, inferior, and of shrinking. The self, as a 
whole, is devalued and considered to be inadequate, incompetent, and worthless. 
Shame might also involve the feeling of being exposed, condemned, and ridiculed 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Vikan, Hassel, Rugset, Johansen, & Moen, 2010).  
 Gilbert (2002) stated that shame can be considered as a ‚multifaceted experience‛ 
with different features and components including: a ‚social or external cognitive 
component, internal self-evaluative component, emotional component, behavioural component,” 
and ‚physiological component‛ (p. 5). A social or external cognitive component refers to the 
idea that shame often occurs in social contexts and evokes thoughts such as ‚others see 
me as worthless and inferior‛. An internal self-evaluative component refers to the notion 
that shame can include negative evaluations of the self and negative thoughts about the 
self, such as ‚I am a failure, inadequate, ugly, and worthless.” An emotional component refers 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          77 
to the idea that feelings and emotions such as self-disgust, anger, and anxiety may occur 
or exist when individuals feel shame. A behavioural component includes defensive 
responses, such as a desire to hide, avoid eye contact, engage in submissive behaviour, 
express anger, or a desire to take revenge that is often associated with shame. A 
physiological component suggests that shame is associated with a stress response, or that 
it may increase parasympathetic activity.  
 
1.2 What Kind of Emotion is Shame? 
Emotions such as sadness, happiness, fear, anger, and disgust are usually regarded as 
basic emotions because they are assumed to be biologically primitive, and to have 
survival and reproductive values (Ortony & Turner, 1990; Tracy & Robins, 2004). For 
example, it is often mentioned in the literature that fear evokes the fight-or-flight 
reaction, which is a physiological response to a potential threat or attack, and is 
essential for the survival of animals and humans. The basic emotions are also thought to 
be universal and pan-cultural; they are associated with recognisable facial expressions 
that convey a particular meaning or information in all cultures across the world. 
Furthermore, basic emotions do not necessarily require higher cognition or thought 
processes; therefore, they can be experienced by both humans and animals (Ortony & 
Turner, 1990; Tracy & Robins, 2004).  
 Unlike basic emotions, shame does not seem to have distinctive universal facial 
expressions, and is not experienced similarly in different cultures (Edelstein & Shaver, 
2007). Emotions such as shame, pride, guilt, embarrassment, envy, empathy, and 
jealousy are associated with a sense of self and self-awareness; hence, they belong to a 
family of self-conscious emotions (Gilbert, 2011; M. Lewis, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
To experience shame, individuals need an ability to form self-representations, 
internalise external values, and compare and evaluate themselves. Therefore, shame is 
not experienced in species with lower cognitive abilities and understanding (M. Lewis, 
1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
 Nevertheless, Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny (2007) considered shame to 
be a basic emotion. They have argued against the binary classification of emotions 
(primary versus secondary or basic versus complex). They suggested that it would be 
more suitable to regard emotions along a continuing axis from basic to more complex. 
According to these authors, shame fulfils most of the essential criteria for a basic 
emotion. For instance, they reasoned that although shame does not have a defined facial 
expression, it can be identified through a mixture of facial and bodily behaviours, such 
as gaze avoidance and a head down slumped posture. They further acknowledged that 
there is insufficient evidence to support the notion that shame is expressed or displayed 
similarly across different cultures; however, they asserted that ‚shame-like‛ emotions 
are present in almost all cultures. Specifically, these kinds of emotions are evoked when 
there is a feeling that the self is threatened or is positioned as having a lower status 
(Kemeny, Gruenewald, & Dickerson, 2004). Although no consensus exists in research or 
theories that focus on emotion classification, the view that shame is a self-conscious 
emotion predominates in the literature.  
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          78 
1.3 The Development of Shame 
It is believed that self-conscious emotions, such as shame, guilt, and pride, do not exist 
at birth (Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007; M. Lewis, 1995, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
Experiencing these emotions seems to depend on particular cognitive prerequisites 
(Stipek, 1995). In particular, since the notion of self must be developed, and children do 
not have a sense of self as autonomous beings until the second year of their lives, self-
conscious emotions begin to emerge between the ages of 18 and 24 months (M. Lewis, 
2007). Before this age, children experience emotions such as joy and happiness, but not 
self-evaluative emotions such as shame and pride (Stipek, 1995). By the end of their 
second year, children recognise themselves in a mirror and start to form thoughts about 
their physical beings (M. Lewis, 1992).  
 M. Lewis (1992, 2000) has postulated a model of emotional development in 
which emotions appearing at birth and requiring little or no cognition are called 
‚primary‛ or ‚basic‛ emotions. The model proposes that, at the age of around 15 to 18 
months, the idea of ‚me‛ or self-awareness occurs. Around this period, self-conscious 
non-evaluative emotions such as embarrassment, envy, and empathy, which do not 
require self-evaluation, emerge. These emotions are based on self-awareness, but not on 
self-evaluation. M. Lewis (2007) called these emotions self-conscious exposed emotions. The 
model further suggests that around their third birthday, children start to learn about 
standards, rules, and goals by which they can evaluate their own behaviour. They also 
begin to make attributions about the self, and decisions about their success or failure. 
These complex cognitive abilities facilitate the rise of self-conscious evaluative emotions 
such as pride, shame, and guilt (M. Lewis, 2007).  
 There is some empirical evidence that indicates that two-year old children are 
capable of showing signs of guilt and shame. For example, Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and 
Cole (1993) found that two-year old children demonstrate shame-relevant behaviour, 
such as avoidance and hiding, or guilt-like behaviour, such as approach and mending, 
when they broke the experimenter’s (rigged) clown rag doll, which presumably had 
sentimental value for the experimenter. More importantly, M. Lewis, Alessandri, and 
Sullivan (1992) demonstrated that three-year old children are cognitively able to 
evaluate task difficulty and to rate their performance accordingly. In particular, they 
found that three-year old children, who failed to perform well on an easy task, showed 
greater signs of shame (body collapsed, lowered eyes, downward gaze and so on) than 
did those who failed to perform well on a difficult task. In other words, failure on its 
own did not evoke a feeling of shame; it might have induced sadness or 
disappointment in some children, but only those children who failed the easy task 
experienced shame.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the shame or guilt-related 
behaviours, such as gaze aversion, or the avoidance tendencies that were observed in 
this experiment are not exclusive to the feeling of shame or guilt (Barrett et al., 1993). It 
is debatable whether eye gaze aversion or slumped shoulders in young children can be 
interpreted as early signs of shame. In fact, Ferguson and Stegge (1995) claimed that, 
while five and six-year old children are aware of shame and guilt and recognise them as 
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negative emotions, they seem unable to describe a situation in which they have felt 
shame or guilt.  
 Furthermore, Griffin (1995) contended that children do not experience self-
conscious emotions such as shame and pride in an adult form before the age of seven to 
eight years. For example, when a group of five-year old children were asked to indicate 
how a child who had violated a social standard and had been judged negatively in front 
of his classmates felt, the majority of the children stated that the child felt sad, mad or 
bad, but not ashamed or embarrassed. According to Griffin (1995), understanding social 
standards, recognising violations, and being aware of a judgmental audience are 
essential for experiencing shame and guilt, and children do not fully develop these 
abilities until the age of eight.  
 Similarly, Leary (2007a) stated that self-conscious emotions are essentially social 
emotions, and are evoked when an individual is able to imagine him- or herself in 
others’ minds, and to recognise that others form opinions, or judge and evaluate the 
self. In this regard, Heerey, Keltner, and Capps (2003) demonstrated that children with 
autism, who had difficulty recognising and understanding that others form mental 
states different from their own perspectives, minds, and beliefs (impairment in theory 
of mind), also had a problem identifying non-verbal expressions of embarrassment and 
shame in comparison to children without autism. However, their ability to identify non-
self-conscious emotions, such as anger, disgust, and contempt, was not significantly 
different from that of children without autism.  
 It is perhaps reasonable to conclude that three-year old children show signs of 
shame, but that sophisticated reasoning about shame and a complete understanding of 
this complex emotion does not occur until the age of seven or eight. For instance, 
Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, and Deij (2004) found that children seven-years old and 
older attributed a greater degree of shame to a protagonist who did something wrong 
that consequently led to negative identity and self-evaluation (such as lying about 
taking necessary medicine and getting sick as a result), but attributed more guilt to a 
protagonist who did something wrong that did not lead to unwanted identity, such as 
sending a family pet away because of the protagonist’s allergy. This study showed that 
seven-year old children are able to appreciate the sophisticated and subtle differences 
between shame and guilt, which are usually seen in adults (Lagattuta & Thompson, 
2007).  
 
1.4 Parenting and Shame 
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1983) proposes that forming a bond with others, 
particularly with a primary caregiver, is essential for children’s survival. Based on this 
theory, children have an innate drive to seek a relationship with a protective adult. 
More importantly, this theory suggests that the quality of the early relationships 
between children and their attachment figures leads to the development of Internal 
Working Models (IWMs), which include mental representations, beliefs, and 
expectations that children develop about the self, others, and the relationships between 
the self and others. This internal working model conceivably determines how the child 
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will interact with others in the future. For example, the infant’s experience of sensitive 
care leads to the development of secure attachment, which in turn encourages the child 
to see the self positively and to be more agreeable in social encounters. On the other 
hand, insecure attachment (insensitive and poor primary care) leads to the formation of 
a negative self-image, which in turn contributes to a lack of confidence and self-doubt 
(see Thompson, 2006, for a review).  
 Colman and Thompson (2002) found that, while engaging in problem solving 
tasks, insecure children seek their mother’s help more quickly and often in unnecessary 
situations, and they express more frustration than do securely attached children. More 
interestingly, when experiencing failure, securely attached children were confident 
enough to see and accept their limitations and imperfections effortlessly, while insecure 
children struggled to acknowledge their weaknesses (Clark & Symons, 2000). 
Furthermore, Kelley, Brownell, and Campbell (2000) showed that critical and negative 
maternal attitudes during a challenging task at 24 months were related to the 
experience of shame and avoidance at 36 months. On the contrary, positive maternal 
evaluations predicted higher determination and motivation in solving a challenging 
task. 
 In general, it seems that children tend to internalise their parents’ attitudes 
towards themselves (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995), which implies that if parents are hostile 
and critical, children will view themselves in a negative light and criticise themselves 
harshly (Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007). Bennett, Sullivan, and M. Lewis (2005) argued 
that harsh parenting, criticism, and physical abuse lead children to believe that they are 
unwanted and undesirable, which ultimately induces shame. These authors found that 
physical abuse is related to shame, and that shame partially mediates the relationship 
between abuse and behavioural maladjustments. Similarly, Gilbert, Allan, and Goss 
(1996) found that the memory of being put-down, non-favoured, and belittled by 
parents during childhood is related to shame-proneness in adulthood.  
 Moreover, Andrews’ research (1995, 1998, 2002) indicated that shame-proneness 
is likely to stem from the experience of abuse, especially when the abuse lasts for a long 
time. It seems likely that a multi-dimensional relationship exists between shame and 
childhood abuse. Abuse (physical, sexual, or verbal) can make individuals feel inferior 
and small. In other words, abuse of any kind is likely to put victims in a subordinate 
position and to trigger submissive reactions (Andrews, 2002). It is not uncommon to see 
that the abused child is stigmatised and blamed by the perpetrator and others in these 
circumstances, which perhaps adds to the feeling of shame. Abused children may think 
that there is something wrong with them that attracted the abuser. Even when the 
abuse is discovered, the child is not relieved. In fact, after the discovery, he or she may 
experience a higher level of shame (Feiring, Taska, & M. Lewis, 2002). The child may 
fear how he or she will be perceived or treated in the future. There is also a possibility 
that the involuntary physiological responses that are experienced during sexual abuse 
cause further shame. Under these circumstances, victims of sexual abuse blame 
themselves for unwanted reactions and feel disgusted with themselves (Pettersen, 
2009). 
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 Overall, research on attachment and self-image suggests that feelings of shame 
may arise as a result of dysfunctional child-parent interactions. In particular, rejection 
by significant others may damage a child’s sense of self and self-image, which 
consequently may cause him or her to be ashamed of the self or hate the self (also see 
Mills, 2005).  
 
1.5 When does Shame Happen? 
Some predominant accounts in the literature describe the experience of shame and the 
root thereof. There are indications that people tend to experience shame when they 
become aware of the difference between their actual and ideal self-representation, 
attribute a negative event to the self and evaluate the self negatively, or see themselves 
as having a lower status. In this part, we look at each of these theories.  
 
1.5.1 Actual self-versus ideal self-image with regard to shame 
 Older psychoanalytic approaches argued that shame arises when there is a conflict 
between the ego (the identity that resembles the real self) and the ego-ideal (the perfect 
and ideal image to which one aspires). Scholars assumed that guilt was evoked when 
there was a discrepancy between the ego and the superego; in other words, the 
conscience, cultural, and moral standards (also see Barrett, 1995; M. Lewis, 1992; 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
  Similarly, but concentrating on the self and the difference between self-
representations, Higgins (1987) proposed the self-discrepancy theory which focused on 
inconsistencies or conflicts that may exist between different characteristics of the self. 
One of the main purposes of this theory was to associate different kinds of emotional 
vulnerabilities with different types of incompatible self-beliefs. In order to do so, this 
theory postulated three dimensions of the self: 
 The actual self, which includes characteristics and attributes that someone has, or 
that other people think he or she possesses,  
 The ideal self, which refers to characteristics and attributes that someone wishes 
for or hopes to obtain (wishes, hopes, and aspirations), and  
 The ought self, which involves characteristics or attributes that someone thinks 
that he or she should have, such as duty, obligations, and responsibilities. 
 Furthermore, this theory discriminates between two standpoints from which the 
self can be evaluated:  
 A personal perspective/standpoint (what you believe), and  
 Others’ perspectives/standpoints (what significant others believe).  
 Considering both the self-domains and standpoints six, different self-
representations are produced: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, 
ought/own, and ought/other. Actual/own and actual/other are known as self-concepts, 
particularly actual/own, while ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other 
guide or direct individuals, and are known as self-guides.  
 Broadly speaking, self-discrepancy theory predicts that the difference between 
the actual self and the ideal self induces dejection-related emotions such as sadness or 
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disappointment because one’s desires or wishes have not been fulfilled, while the 
difference between the actual self and the ought self generates agitation-related 
emotions such as fear, threat, and restlessness because one has failed to meet 
obligations and expectations.  
 It is relevant here that self-discrepancy theory predicts that failure to meet 
others’ expectations (a discrepancy between actual/own and ideal/other) induces 
feelings of shame, embarrassment, and despondency because these emotions are related 
to beliefs that someone has lost her or his value or worth in the eyes of others. In 
contrast, when there is a discrepancy between actual/own versus ought/own, feelings of 
guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness will be elicited because one has failed to live up to 
one’s own standards and obligations.  
 There is some empirical evidence that suggests that self-discrepancies are related 
to psychological problems. For example, Higgins, Klein, and Strauman (1985) found 
that differences between actual and ideal representations were related to dejection-
related emotions, such as depression, and that discrepancies between actual and ought 
self-representations were associated with agitation-related emotions, such as anxiety. 
Similarly, when individuals were asked to write about actual/ideal differences, they 
reported more sadness, and when they were asked to write about actual/ought 
discrepancies, they felt more agitated (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986).  
 Nonetheless, the extent to which this theory is accurate in terms of predicting 
emotional vulnerabilities, such as shame and guilt, is unclear. For instance, Tangney, 
Niedenthal, Covert, and Barlow (1998) tested Higgins’s (1987) hypotheses, and 
questioned their credibility. Specifically, they asked participants to complete a series of 
questionnaires, such as the Selves Questionnaire that measures self-discrepancy, and 
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA), which measures shame and guilt-proneness. 
Their analyses indicated that not only was the discrepancy between actual/own and 
ideal/other related to shame-proneness, but also all forms of self-discrepancies. In 
addition, the association among all types of self-discrepancies were relatively high, 
which brings the validity of the Selves Questionnaire and the theory into question.  
 According to the personal accounts of ashamed individuals, Lindsay-Hartz 
(1984) found that failing to achieve an ideal image is not essential for experiencing 
shame. Following these interviews, Lindsay-Hartz concluded that the feeling of shame 
was more closely related to the recognition of a negative ideal (who we would not like 
to be) rather than to the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self (Tangney 
& Dearing, 2002). Lindsay-Hartz (1984) explained that ‚what we realize about ourselves 
when ashamed is that we are who we do not want to be‛ (p.697). For example, participants 
mentioned things like ‚I am fat and ugly‛ rather than ‚I failed to be pretty‛ and ‚I am bad 
and evil‛ rather than ‚I am not as good as I want to be‛ (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & 
Mascolo, 1995, p.227); or ‚I realized that I was a crook and a thief, and I didn’t want to be‛ 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984, p.697). This difference is not merely semantic. In fact, the 
participants claimed that the difference was critical for understanding their feelings 
(Gilbert, 1998).  
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1.5.2 Cognitive attributes and shame  
The way shame is defined in cognitive-attributional theories over the last three decades 
has been very popular. These theories explain how and when shame is evoked. 
Specifically, they indicate that shame has a cognitive, as well as an affective element (M. 
Lewis, 2003; Dearing & Tangney, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2007b). Prominently, M. Lewis 
(1992) argued that shame is not elicited in response to a specific situation, but that its 
generation merely depends on an individual’s interpretation of a negative event. Thus, 
an event that causes shame in one person may cause guilt in another (M. Lewis, 1992; 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In other words, shame is distinguished from similar self-
conscious emotions on the basis of an attribution pattern.  
 According to attribution theories (Weiner, 1985), when explaining reasons for 
our (and others’) actions, we consider three dimensions:  
1. Locus: whether an action is caused by an actor (internal) or by a situation 
(external), 
2.  Stability: whether actions or causes are fixed (stable) or not (unstable), and  
3. Controllability: whether individuals have control over some causes 
(controllable) or do not (uncontrollable). 
 As reported by the cognitive-attributional theory of shame, elicitation of shame is 
associated with internal, stable, and uncontrollable attributions (M. Lewis, 1992, 2003; 
Mills, 2005). For example, attributing failure in an exam to uncontrollable factors such 
as low ability is likely to induce shame rather than any other emotions (Brown & 
Weiner, 1984; Weiner, 1985). 
 Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) investigated the association between 
shame-proneness, psychopathology, and attribution style. Examining several samples 
of undergraduate students, these authors found that the tendency to make internal, 
stable, and global attributions regarding negative incidents was highly and positively 
associated with proneness to shame. Specifically, participants who stated that they 
tended to hide after making a mistake at work (shame-prone individuals) were also 
inclined to attribute someone’s hostility to their own personal characteristics, an 
indication of stable and global attribution (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). More 
importantly, the results of this study demonstrated that individuals’ affective styles 
(shame-proneness and guilt-proneness) explained a significant variance in depression 
over and above the variance explained by attribution style. The findings from the 
regression analysis indicated that, although shame-proneness and attribution style are 
significantly correlated, they are not the same constructs. After controlling for the effect 
of attributional style, shame explained an additional 8-15% variance in depression 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002).  
 Encouraged by cognitive-attributional and appraisal theories, Tracy and Robins 
(2004, 2007b) proposed the appraisal-based model of self-conscious emotions. 
According to this model, when encountering a situation, the first evaluative step is to 
see whether the situation ‚is relevant to survival‛ goals (Tracy & Robins, 2007b, p. 9). If 
the event is considered pertinent to survival goals, it will induce one of the basic 
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emotions. However, if the circumstance is not relevant to survival goals, it will not 
evoke any basic emotions.  
 In the next step, the model suggests that individuals will consider whether the 
event is relevant for the self. If a situation is meaningful for the self and focuses on the 
self, related self-representations might be activated explicitly or implicitly, which in 
turn leads to self-evaluation. Self-representations may include the actual self, the ideal 
self or the ‘ought’ self. They may also include private aspects of the self or of the public 
self. As indicated by this theory, only after the activation of self-representations are self-
conscious emotions generated (Tracy & Robins, 2007b).  
 Once self-representations are activated, events can be evaluated to see whether 
they are important for identity goals, such as: ‚Does it matter for who I am or would like to 
be?” (Tracy & Robins, 2007b, p.10). According to the model, only when self-
representations are considered important for identity goals can self-conscious emotions 
be evoked. However, if there are no identity concerns, no self-conscious emotions will 
be generated.  
 The next aspect involves identity-goal congruence. This step governs the valence 
of emotions. If the event is consistent with one’s goals, it elicits positive emotions, 
whereas if the event is not consistent with one’s identity goals, it elicits negative 
emotions. 
  Individuals are then motivated to identify the cause of the event. By using a 
series of evaluations, individuals determine whether the event has an internal or 
external cause. If an individual makes an internal attribution for the event, self-
conscious emotions result. For example, if someone makes a negative internal 
attribution regarding failure in an exam, he or she is likely to feel shame or guilt. 
However, if he or she makes a positive attribution, feelings of pride will be elicited. 
External attributions evoke basic emotions such as anger.  
 Furthermore, according to this model, in order to distinguish between self-
conscious emotions (shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride), it is essential to consider 
other causal attributions such as stability (stable and invariant), controllability 
(controllable vs. uncontrollable) and globality (the individual as a whole or some aspect 
of the person). The model predicts that shame is evoked by internal, uncontrollable, 
stable, and global attributions, while guilt is elicited by internal, controllable, unstable, 
and specific (not global) attributions. Embarrassment can occur only when individuals 
pay attention to the public self and when public self-representations are activated. 
Internal attributions are sufficient for embarrassment to occur. No complex cognitive 
ability or further attributions are needed to evoke embarrassment.  
 In support of this theory, Tracy and Robins (2006) conducted a series of studies. 
In one of these studies, they asked participants to indicate how they felt about their 
current grade point average. They then asked a trained analyst to code the contents of 
the participants’ responses and determine whether the participants thought the grades 
that they had received depended on internal causes, such as ability, or on external 
causes, such as effort. In addition, the level of controllability that the participants 
thought they had over a situation was determined. It was found that internal 
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attributions were associated with feelings of guilt and shame. Furthermore, students 
who attributed their low grades to their abilities (an internal, stable, and uncontrollable 
cause) were more likely to express shame, while those students who attributed their 
low grades to their effort (an internal, unstable, controllable cause) were more likely to 
feel guilt.  
 Considering attributions in shame from a different perspective, Yi and 
Baumgartner (2011) asked participants to recall a recent experience of impulse buying, 
and then indicate how they felt after buying that item. It was found that impulsive 
shoppers who attributed the outcome to stable and uncontrollable aspects (for example, 
‚my impulse buying reflects my weak self‛, p.459) were more likely to feel shame than 
those who attributed the outcome to unstable and controllable aspects (for example, ‚I 
got temporarily carried away by a discount”, p.459). According to the authors, encouraging 
impulse buyers to attribute their impulse shopping to situational and short-term 
factors, instead of to fixed and global elements, may induce guilt rather than feelings of 
shame which, in turn, may help individuals to use problem-focused strategies rather 
than avoidance-based methods to cope with their feelings.  
 
1.5.3 Rank, status, dominance, and shame 
Social ranking theory (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Gilbert, 2000) proposes that shame 
arises as a result of one’s perception of one’s social status/rank. In social situations, 
people compete with each other for acceptance, approval, and attractiveness. People 
want to be desired, chosen, and valued, rather than being avoided or rejected. 
According to this theory, shame results when one views oneself as a being of relatively 
low social rank or in an unwanted subordinate position. For example, someone may see 
him/herself as having personal attributes (body-shape, size), personality characteristics 
(boring and dishonest), or as engaged in behaviour (stealing and lying) that others will 
find unattractive or unacceptable. This person may think that he or she is flawed, 
inadequate, and inferior. In addition, the said person may become vulnerable to 
criticism and social put-downs (Gilbert & Miles, 2000), or act submissively (Gilbert, 
2000). Therefore, according to this theory, those who are in low status positions, for 
whatever reasons, are more prone to experiencing shame. Empirical findings 
corroborate that shame is highly correlated with feelings of inferiority/submissiveness 
(Birchwood et al., 2006). For example, Gilbert (2000) found that those participants who 
scored highly for three measures of shame also rated their relative social rank as low on 
a social comparison scale (e.g., ‚In relation to others I feel inferior‛, p.179), but had higher 
scores on the submissive behaviour scale (e.g., "I agreed I was wrong even though I knew I 
wasn’t,” p.179). In other words, feelings of shame were significantly associated with the 
perceptions of low social rank and expressions of submissive actions.  
 It seems that whether we focus on the issue of rank, status, or dominance 
regarding shame, or whether we believe that shame, like most negative emotions, 
involves a comparison of the self to the perfect image (or becoming someone who we 
would not like to be), or whether we consider that shame arises as a result of negative 
attribution styles, we conclude that the experience of shame involves a negative self-
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image. Even in cognitive-attributional theories of shame, if one does not have a negative 
self-image, why does a person attribute a negative event to the self? Negative self-image 
seems to fertilise and make it possible for shame to occur and grow or vice versa. In 
Table 1.1, we see how the conceptualisation of shame has evolved or changed over the 
years. The notion that shame is a self-related emotion and highly negative is evident in 
most of these theories.  
 
Table 1.1: Conceptualisation of Shame from Different Perspectives 
Conceptualisation of shame  
 
Proposed by these theorists 
Becoming exposed and self-conscious, related to 
physical/body performances such as toilet training 
For example, Erik Erikson (1950) 
Differences between the ego and the ego-ideal  For example, Piers and Singer (1953) 
A primitive innate affect. It occurs when there is 
disturbance/interruption or an abrupt end to 
excitement or joy 
For example, Tomkin (1963); Kaufman (1996); 
Nathanson (1994) 
The self is considered bad; 
a discrepancy between actual/own and ideal/other 
For example, H.B. Lewis (1971); Higgins (1987) 
Making internal, stable, and uncontrollable 
attribution, attributing a negative incident to the 
self  
For example, M. Lewis (1992); Tracy & Robins 
(2004) 
Realisation of low status/rank, feeling inferior and 
submissive 
For example, Gilbert (2000) 
 
1.6 Expression and Body Responses in Shame 
The most commonly identified non-verbal expressions of shame include gaze aversion, 
a downward head, slumped shoulders, and a collapsed posture (Keltner & Buswell, 
1996; Keltner & Harker, 1998). Of these, body movements such as drooping shoulders 
and a slumped posture seem to be important indicators in the recognition of shame. 
This might be because shame does not have unique or exclusive facial expressions 
(Ferguson & Stegge, 1995). For instance, gaze aversion, downward head movements, 
and blushing can also occur when someone feels shy or is embarrassed (Crozier, 2014).  
 As a result, observers tend to be less accurate in identifying non-verbal 
expressions of shame in comparison to basic emotions (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). For 
example, the level of accuracy for recognising emotions such as anger or disgust is 
above 80%, while the level of accuracy for identifying shame is about 50-60% (Keltner & 
Harker, 1998). Supposedly, the level of accuracy could be lower depending on the 
comparison emotions. It is difficult to imagine how individuals in the state of shame 
could be differentiated from those who have been humiliated, for example. Thus, 
identifying and recognising shame based body language might be complex and 
challenging.  
 Looking at bodily responses, when experiencing shame, the indicators include 
blushing (Crozier, 2004, 2014), increased body temperature, and sweating. In fact, these 
responses are very similar and associated with physiological arousal responses that 
occur with anxiety and stress (Gilbert, 1998, 2002). 
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 Dickerson and colleagues (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Grunewald 
et al., 2007) posited that shame evokes a series of psychological and physiological 
responses, such as an increase in cytokine activity and cortisol. More specifically, these 
researchers stated that “events that threaten the social self-elicit activation of the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) and proinflammatory immune systems, leading to the 
release of the HPA hormone cortisol and inflammatory cytokines‛ (Gruenewald et al., 2007, p. 
74).  
 Recent research confirms a link between shame (and other negative self-
evaluative states) and increased levels of cortisol and proinflammatory cytokine 
activity. For example, in one study, participants who were induced to experience self-
blame and threats to their social self by writing about their personal experiences, not 
only experienced a higher level of shame in comparison to other negative emotions, 
they also showed a heightened level of proinflammatory cytokine (Dickerson, Kemeny, 
Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004). Similarly, Dickerson, Gable, Irwin, Aziz, and Kemeny (2009) 
found that female participants who were asked to give a speech or perform a math test 
in front of an evaluative audience (a social evaluative threat) showed an increase in 
proinflammatory cytokine in comparison to those who performed the tasks without the 
presence of an evaluative audience. Furthermore, M. Lewis and Ramsay (2002) 
demonstrated that four-year old children, who expressed signs of shame and evaluative 
embarrassment after failing a colour-matching task in a laboratory, also had a higher 
cortisol response. 
 Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that experiencing low social status may 
affirm a continuous threat to the social self (a chronic experience of shame), which in 
turn may forecast health problems. In this regard, Dickerson, Gruenewald, et al. (2004) 
found that HIV patients who were stigmatised and rejected because of their sexual 
orientation died on average two years before those who were not stigmatised. 
However, HIV patients who experienced other negative emotions such as anger, 
anxiety, or sadness did not experience a CD4 T-Cell decline over seven years 
(Gruenewald et al., 2007). To put it differently, shame seems to be the only negative 
emotion that predicts health outcomes in people who have been shunned and rejected. 
 
1.7 Classification for Shame 
In this part, in order to better understand the impact of shame, it is important to look at 
the ways shame has been classified in the scholarly literature, namely state shame, 
chronic (trait) shame, shame-proneness, internal shame, and external shame. 
 
1.7.1 State shame, chronic (trait) shame, and shame-proneness  
Although often neglected, state shame can be differentiated from trait shame. In 
general, at the state level, emotions produce momentary reactions to emotion-inducing 
events that do not have long-lasting effects. They may evoke particular thoughts or 
motivate specific behaviours but, after some time, their effect will subside and 
individuals can function normally. At the trait level, however, emotions are experienced 
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frequently and have severe impacts on life functions and adaptability (Ferguson & 
Stegge, 1995).  
 Correspondingly, state shame refers to a transient feeling of shame in response to 
a particular situation (Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994). At the state level, shame may 
regulate social interaction, and increase humility or conformity (Ferguson & Stegge, 
1995). In retrospective studies of shame, participants are often asked to recall or 
describe a personal episode of the state of shame versus the state of guilt (Tangney, 
1992). The experience of shame is often accompanied by a feeling of being self-
conscious, exposed or inferior, lacking power, feeling inhibited, and results in a faster 
heartbeat, muscle tensing, and being hot or flushed (Turner, 2014; Wallbott & Scherer, 
1989; Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983). Although the experience of shame is unpleasant 
and people often try to avoid it, state shame is not an indicator of an emotional 
disorder. On the contrary, inability to experience shame is often unacceptable and, to 
some extent, a sign of immorality (Tantam, 1998). 
 Trait shame (chronic) shame refers to a frequent or constant feeling of shame. 
Trait shame may be a state of being rather than an emotional state (Tantam, 1998). At 
the trait level, an individual’s identity is pervaded by a sense of worthlessness, 
inadequacy, and helplessness (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995). Some shame theorists, such as 
Tangney and her colleagues, believe that a corresponding trait or disposition for state 
shame is shame-proneness, which is defined as a propensity to experience shame in 
response to a range of negative situations (Tangney, 1996). In particular, Tangney (1996) 
contended that shame-prone individuals (as opposed to guilt-prone individuals) 
experience shame more easily when they are in a specific negative situation.  
 Harper (2011) suggested that trait shame may arise because one is frequently 
suppressed or put down. In this situation, the said person may internalise the feeling of 
shame, and shame becomes part of his/her identity and disposition. Similarly, Tantam 
(1998) stated that frequent reminders of one’s faults and awareness of such faults may 
lead to the development of trait shame.  
 Unsurprisingly, trait shame and shame-proneness are associated with a wide 
variety of psychological symptoms. For example, trait shame or shame-proneness often 
have stronger associations with psychological problems such as depression and anxiety 
than does state shame (Allan, Gilbert, & Goss, 1994; Rusch et al., 2007).  
 Literature regarding shame focuses heavily on dispositional shame (Leeming & 
Boyle, 2002). Some researchers concentrate on shame-proneness (being susceptible to 
the experience of shame in response to particular situations), some pay more attention 
to global shame (feeling shame frequently, irrespective of particular situations), and 
some focus on trait shame in a specific domain such as feeling shame about physical 
appearance, ethnicity, and education (Andrews, 1998). 
 State shame is usually examined when shame is induced in experimental studies 
or when participants are asked to recall a personal shame-inducing episode. However, 
it should be noted that there is no strict boundary between state shame and trait shame. 
A person who is prone to the experience of shame and high in trait shame is also more 
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likely to experience shame in response to a specific shame-inducing situation (state 
shame).  
 
1.7.2 Internal and external shame  
Gilbert (1998, 2000, 2003) differentiated between ‚feeling shame‛ and ‚being shamed‛. He 
suggested that when an individual feels shame about his/her own attributes, this is 
internal shame (feeling shame); this emerges when an individual evaluates and judges 
the self negatively and sees the self negatively. According to Gilbert (1998), individuals 
may also feel shame because others see and judge them negatively. This is known as 
external shame, and occurs when one thinks that, in the minds of others; he/she will be 
rejected or attacked. In other words, an individual feels shame because others have a 
negative image of the self and he/she sees the self through their eyes. For example, 
someone may not reveal his or her sexual orientation to colleagues or family members 
because he/she is afraid of negative judgement or unfair treatment. The said person 
does not feel shame internally per se; however, external situations may lead him/her to 
feel ashamed (Gilbert, 1998). The idea that shame is experienced as a result of others’ 
image of the self resembles Cooley’s (1902, p.183) concept of the ‚looking-glass self,‛ 
which refers to the notion that people evaluate themselves as they believe others see 
them (see also Scheff, 2000). In this regard, it is worth pointing out that individuals 
usually evaluate themselves not only based on how others really view them, but also 
based on how they think others see or evaluate them (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008; Shrauger 
& Schoeneman, 1979). It is possible to not feel shame even if others consider the self 
negatively; however, it is unlikely that one will not feel shame when the self is 
evaluated negatively by the self (Gilbert, 2000). In other words, external shame does not 
lead to internal shame necessarily, while internal shame can have a great impact on 
feelings of external shame.  
 
2. Shame and Other Constructs 
 
People in the general population often have difficulty in distinguishing shame from 
similar emotions and constructs, such as guilt and embarrassment (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). It is the case that the terms shame and guilt are used interchangeably. However, 
research has documented that feeling shame is very different from feeling guilt, 
embarrassment, or shyness, and has different consequences. In order to understand 
what feelings of shame entail, it is necessary to examine the difference between shame 
and other similar constructs.  
 
2.1 Shame and Guilt 
The distinction between shame and guilt has been highly influenced by the work of 
psychoanalyst Helen. B. Lewis (1971). After examining clinical cases, she concluded that 
a fundamental difference between shame and guilt lies in the role of the self. In shame, 
the focus of evaluation is on the self (e.g., I was a bad person), while the focus of 
evaluation in guilt is on behaviour (e.g., my action was bad or I did a bad thing). 
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Pursuing H. B. Lewis’ line of work, Tangney and colleagues (see Tangney & Dearing, 
2002) have provided evidence for the dissimilarities between shame and guilt over the 
past three decades. Some of the strongest support for this notion comes from a series of 
studies conducted by Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994). In these studies, 
participants were asked to recall a personal experience of shame/guilt (Study 1c), or to 
put themselves in situations that are shame/guilt-inducing (Studies 1a and 1b). They 
were then asked to produce counterfactuals in order to change the problematic 
situations. It is interesting that, regarding experiences of shame, participants were 
inclined to undo aspects of themselves (‚if only I weren’t‛), while in guilt experiences 
they tended to undo specific behaviour (‚if only I hadn’t‛). This is one of the main 
reasons why the feeling of guilt is regarded as a less critical and harmful emotion than 
that of shame.  
 Furthermore, it is a common belief that there is a difference between the action 
tendencies of shame and guilt. Shame seems to be associated with avoidance-related 
tendencies, such as avoiding shame-eliciting situations, withdrawing from others or 
hiding. Guilt, on the other hand, is related to approach tendencies, such as approaching 
others and trying to repair the damage done, for example by apologising. Guilt may 
encourage a change in actions (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Yi & Baumgartner, 2011).  
As noted, in shame, the focus is on the self, whereas in guilt, individuals are able to 
focus on the wellbeing of others (Joireman, 2004). This is why guilt has been associated 
with perspective-taking and empathy towards others, while in shame the 
preoccupation with the self is at odds with the other-oriented nature of empathy 
(Parker & Thomas, 2009). Shame-prone individuals tend to be self-absorbed and 
oblivious to others’ needs or requests (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It could be assumed 
that shame, especially chronic shame and shame-proneness, makes interpersonal 
encounters difficult not because ashamed individuals do not feel empathy, but because 
they are too self-conscious to show their true emotions and vulnerabilities. They find 
social situations threatening and potentially shaming; hence, they avoid them as much 
as possible.  
 Conventionally, shame is viewed as a public emotion and guilt as a private 
emotion. The experience of shame results from public exposure. In other words, 
individuals feel shame when their transgression has been seen and revealed publicly. In 
this line of thought, Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre (2002) found that when 
participants’ failings were seen by others, they felt a stronger sense of shame than they 
did of guilt. More specifically, this research (Studies 1 and 2) demonstrated that, in 
hypothetical shame and guilt-related situations, when a transgression occurred in 
public and an antagonist was exposed, participants assumed that the antagonist would 
feel more shame than when a transgression occurred in private. However, with regard 
to guilt, the public versus private situation did not matter. Participants assumed that 
the antagonist would feel the same level of guilt in public as well as in private.  
 The notion that shame is a public emotion is to some extent in harmony with 
Gilbert’s (1998, 2000) view of shame, which suggests that shame is related to social 
ranking. When there is no audience, social ranking and status are essentially 
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meaningless (Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011). Nevertheless, support for the public 
versus private nature of shame/guilt is contradictory. For instance, Tangney, Miller, 
Flicker, and Barlow (1996) asked participants to recall personal experiences of shame, 
guilt, and embarrassment. Their findings indicated that shame is not a more public 
emotion than is guilt. According to their analyses, both shame and guilt occurred 
mainly and equally in public. However, 10.4% of the participants’ guilt experiences and 
18.2% of their shame experiences happened in private. The literature suggests that 
shame is a relatively individualised emotion and does not have unique triggers. The 
common view is that the same situation can induce shame in one person and guilt in 
another. It depends on how the role of self is interpreted, not whether the situation 
takes place publicly or privately (Parker & Thomas, 2009). Nevertheless, it should be 
mentioned that shamed individuals feel exposed. Although shame probably does not 
require an actual audience or witness, often the thought of how one’s shortcomings will 
appear to others is salient in the experience of shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The 
fear of negative evaluation is present in the experience of shame. This is perhaps why 
shame is often assumed to be a more public/social emotion than is guilt.  
 
2.2 Shame and Embarrassment 
Some scholars believe that shame and embarrassment are very similar (see Crozier, 
2014, for a review). They argue that the only difference between these two emotions is 
their level of intensity. Embarrassment is believed to be a milder form of state shame 
(M. Lewis, 1995, 1998).  
 M. Lewis (1998, 2000) suggested that there are two types of embarrassment. The 
first type is less intense than shame. It occurs when an individual fails to meet personal 
goals that are not crucial for the identity of that person. For example, if driving is 
strongly related to one’s core identity, failing at it may evoke a feeling of shame. 
However, if driving is not particularly relevant for that person, failing at it may be 
embarrassing rather than shaming. Secondly, people sometimes become embarrassed 
purely because of their presence being acknowledged. This is known as ‚exposure 
embarrassment.” For instance, being complimented or praised for something in front of 
large audience may induce feelings of embarrassment.  
 Surprisingly, Tangney, Miller, et al. (1996) found that shame and embarrassment 
have less in common than do embarrassment and guilt. Embarrassed people believed 
that they were victims of situations. They even found embarrassing situations funny 
and amusing to some extent, rather than painful and intense. Embarrassing situations 
seemed to be more accidental (people said they felt awkward).  
 In cognitive-attributional theories, embarrassment is considered either non-
evaluative (M. Lewis, 2003) or less cognition-dependent (Tracy & Robins, 2004). It 
happens when attention is focused on the public self. It requires attributions to internal 
causes, but does not command any further attributions, and can occur in response to 
stable or unstable and controllable or uncontrollable causes (Tracy & Robins, 2006, 
2007b).  
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 Furthermore, Keltner and Buswell (1996) claimed that embarrassment is 
associated more with the violation of conventions, whereas shame is related more to 
personal failure. These authors found that the most common antecedents of 
embarrassment were physical pitfalls, cognitive shortcomings (such as forgetting a 
name), loss of control over the body (vomiting), and shortcomings in physical 
appearance, such as walking around with toilet paper stuck to one’s shoe.  
 Nonetheless, Sabini, Garvey, and Hall (2001) argued that tripping or falling, for 
instance, are not violations of convention, but can be viewed as a personal failure. They 
argued that if someone’s real weakness is revealed, he /she is likely to feel shame. If 
from one’s own standpoint no real flaw is revealed, but other people think that such a 
flaw has been revealed, that person may feel embarrassment or anger. It depends on 
whether or not it is sensible for the audience to believe that such a flaw exists.  
 After examining the literature, Crozier (2014) found that shame is usually 
differentiated from embarrassment according to the following criteria: intensity (shame 
is more intense than embarrassment); duration (shame lasts longer); self (shame is 
related to negative self-evaluation and a flawed self); breaking social rules (shame is 
related to a breach of fundamental rules); morality (shame is associated with morality); 
audience (need for an audience in embarrassment); physiological differences (blushing 
is associated with embarrassment); uncertainty (after embarrassment, individuals feel 
confused); and non-verbal expression (laughter in embarrassment). However, after 
critically considering the proposed distinctions, Crozier (2014) concluded that no 
consensus exists in the literature regarding the differences between shame and 
embarrassment. For example, while some researchers believe that laughter occurs after 
embarrassment, others argue that laughter follows shame in order to reduce its impact.  
 
2.3 Shame and Low Self-esteem 
Theoretically, shame and self-esteem are different (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Self-
esteem is mostly considered as a self-evaluative construct. Shame, however, is usually 
regarded as an emotion that has cognitive elements (Blum, 2008). Furthermore, self-
esteem is a general evaluation of the self, whereas shame is likely to be a negative 
evaluation of the self in relation to a specific situation (Andrews, 1998; Tangney, 1996). 
Andrews (1998) has suggested that negative self-evaluation may be an essential part of 
shame, but that it is not sufficient as a definition of shame. 
  Nevertheless, Gilbert (1998) argued that the way in which self-esteem is defined 
in the self-esteem literature is very similar to how shame-proneness is described. Along 
this line, Brown and Marshall (2001) found that self-esteem and self-conscious 
emotions, such as shame and pride, are associated. Specifically, individuals with high 
self-esteem tended to experience pride, while those with low self-esteem were inclined 
to feel shame (Brown & Marshall, 2001). This may also indicate that the negative 
feelings reported by people with low self-esteem are usually feelings of shame (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004). 
 Tangney and Dearing (2002) reported a modest correlation between shame-
proneness and self-esteem (r = -.42). They stipulated that a bidirectional link exists 
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between self-esteem and shame. Tangney and Dearing also postulated that individuals 
who are shame-prone do not necessarily have low self-esteem, or vice versa. According 
to their argument, it is possible to have high self-esteem but also to be shame-prone. For 
instance, one may have a positive image of the self (as worthy and likable), while still 
being shame-prone. One may easily experience shame when there is failure or a 
negative incident. Similarly, these authors suggested that it is possible to have low self-
esteem but not to feel shame in response to transgressions or failures.  
 
2.4 Shame and Shyness 
Mosher and White (1981) distinguished shame from shyness and stated that the 
experience of shame in real life situations is more intense and unpleasant than shyness, 
and they argued that it is not acceptable to use shyness and shame interchangeably. 
Shyness seems to be a non-evaluative emotion. It is more closely related to fear than to 
self-evaluation. Therefore, no cognitive complexities are needed to feel shy. Shy people 
become apprehensive and uncomfortable in social situations. Shyness is likely to be 
biologically given, as it has been observed in three-month old infants, while shame 
appears at around the age of 18 months (Blum, 2008; M. Lewis, 2000). However, it is 
debatable to what extent shyness can be considered as a non-evaluative emotion. At 
times, self-evaluation and evaluation of situations are likely to be present when 
individuals experience shyness.  
 
2.5 Shame and Humiliation 
Humiliation includes a sense of being ridiculed, scorned, or degraded by others (Klein, 
1991). Humiliated individuals do not feel responsible for a negative event. They blame 
others or situations, not themselves, for their profound loss of dignity. They probably 
attribute the source of the event to external causes rather than to internal causes. 
Humiliated people think that they are victims of situations (Tantam, 1998). In order to 
feel humiliation, a victim, a humiliator, and an observer are usually required (Klein, 
1991). The victim is powerless, while the humiliator is in power. Shame is more 
connected with feelings of the self about the self, while people who feel humiliated 
think that they do not deserve to be humiliated and treated in such a way. For example, 
a person who has cheated on his or her spouse might feel shame, while the person who 
has been cheated on is most likely to feel humiliated (Klein, 1991). 
 The important thing to remember when we look at all the above distinctions is 
that these emotions can occur simultaneously. For instance, a person who has cheated 
on his/her spouse might feel guilt as well as shame, and we often hear statements such 
as ‚that was so humiliating, I feel so embarrassed‛ in day-to-day conversation. Thus, it is 
vital to acknowledge that the difference between emotions can be easily blurred. In 
addition, there is a possibility that what we feel at the first instance (primary emotion) 
can change or be substituted with another emotion very quickly (secondary emotion). 
Therefore, distinguishing these emotions in some situations might be complex. A 
summary of these differences is presented in the following figure.  
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Figure 1.1: Differences between shame and similar constructs 
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3. Shame, Culture, and Demographic Variables 
 
This section will look at how shame is experienced in different cultures, whether it can 
be vicarious, and consider the effect of demographic variables such as age and gender 
on shame.  
 
3.1 Cultural Differences in Shame 
Wallbott and Scherer (1995) demonstrated that shame is experienced differently in 
collectivist cultures, such as Mexico, Venezuela, India, Brazil, and Chile, and in 
individualist cultures like Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and the United 
States. In comparison to individualistic cultures, the experience of shame in collectivist 
cultures was reported as having a shorter duration and a less negative effect on self-
esteem, as being less immoral and being followed by laughing or smiling (Wallbott & 
Scherer, 1995).  
 This seems to be due to the idea that, in a collectivist culture, the self is 
interdependent and people tend to see themselves in relation to others (Kitayama, 
Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). Therefore, in many collectivist cultures, shame is more 
likely to be determined by social roles rather than by personal failure (Crystal, Parrott, 
Okazaki, & Watanabe, 2001). In these cultures, shame is no longer an individual 
experience, but is associated with cultural values and standards, and conforming to the 
cultural rules is essential for avoiding feelings of shame (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). 
Those who do not behave according to the cultural values or conventional norms are 
not only shamed, but also bring shame to their communities. Hence, in order to restore 
the social image and to claim lost ‚honour,‛ those who tarnish the social reputation and 
violate the social rules are usually punished harshly (Cohen, Vandello, & Rantilla, 
1998). For instance, honour killings or similar accounts demonstrate that the 
perpetrators, who are often members of a family or social group, take drastic measures 
in order to save the social image and family reputation (Lindisfarne, 1998). 
 Unsurprisingly, individuals in collectivist cultures are more likely to experience 
shame when they are around others, because they are more attuned to the presence of 
others (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Moreover, the distinction between shame and guilt is less 
clear in collectivist cultures than it is in individualistic cultures (but also see Wallbott & 
Scherer, 1995, for an opposing view). 
  Although the experience of shame is unlikely to be positive (Edelstein & Shaver, 
2007), in many collectivist cultures shame is considered to be constructive, adaptive, 
informational, and motivational. For instance, 43.5% of Indian students viewed shame 
as more similar to happiness than to anger, while the majority of American students 
believed that shame and anger are more similar. In fact, only 6% of Americans thought 
that shame and happiness share some similarities (Rozin, 2003). The Indian students 
believed that shame and happiness are similar, because they consider both of these 
emotions as socially effective and constructive, while the Americans viewed shame and 
anger as similar because they are both negative (Rozin, 2003). In a similar manner, 
Chinese parents are more likely to implement shame strategies in dealing with their 
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children than are American parents, because they believe that shaming methods can be 
rehabilitating (Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
 Furthermore, Fischer, Manstead, and Rodriguez Mosquera (1999) demonstrated 
that individuals from an honour-based culture such as Spanish viewed shame more 
positively than did participants from an individualist culture (Dutch). For instance, 
when describing their experiences of shame, Spanish participants focused more on 
other people and their relationship with them, whereas Dutch participants focused 
more on their own personal experiences and feelings of self-failure (Rodriguez 
Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000).  
 Culture also affects how individuals respond to the experience of shame. For 
example, the experience of shame for Filipino salespeople, who come from an 
interdependent-oriented culture, is associated with social involvement and an attempt 
to rebuild social contacts with customers, while Dutch salespersons, who belong to an 
independent-oriented culture, tend to use defensive mechanisms such as avoiding 
conversations with consumers in order to protect their self-image after experiencing 
shame (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003).  
 
3.2 Shame in a Group Context 
There is a great likelihood that individuals experience chronic shame as a result of their 
membership of a specific group. For example, ethnic minorities, immigrants, or those 
with an alternative lifestyle may feel ashamed because of their membership in low-
status or stigmatised groups (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). In this regard, Keltner and 
Harker (1998) argued that even observers tend to assign feelings of shame to women or 
African Americans, who stereotypically belong to low-status groups. 
 In addition, people are blamed and stigmatised for the negative behaviour of 
their in-group. For example, family members of people with mental or drug/alcohol 
problems experience significant stigma and shame (Corrigan, Watson, & Miller, 2006). 
Our social groups are a very important part of our identity, so the actions or status of 
our in-group has implications for the self. In particular, negative behaviour on the part 
of our group’s members may damage our self-image, threaten our social identity, and 
negatively affect our social standing (Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007; Schmader & 
Lickel, 2006).  
 Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) demonstrated that Americans who identify 
strongly with their nationality reported feeling shame when other Americans showed 
prejudice towards out-groups (for example, people of Middle Eastern descent, after the 
September 11th attacks). Nonetheless, individuals are likely to feel shame in response to 
an in-group’s behaviour if they feel that the person’s action is relevant to them and they 
share an identity with that particular group and with the wrongdoer (Lickel, Schmader, 
Curtis, Scarnie, & Ames, 2005). For example, German participants reported that they 
would experience a significant amount of shame in regard to the holocaust and 
treatment of the Jews in front of out-groups (such as in front of a foreigner or a Jewish 
person) but not when they were with their in-group (with other Germans) or alone 
(Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006). 
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 In addition, studies suggest that, after vicarious shame, some participants are 
motivated to distance themselves from the shameful events (Lickel et al., 2005), while 
others may engage in activities in order to restore the damaged group’s image (Lickel et 
al., 2007). It is interesting that, as Gunn and Wilson (2011) demonstrated, group 
affirmation assists individuals to express shame over the mistreatment of out-groups, 
which may in turn facilitate reparatory attitudes and actions. For example, in their 
study, Canadians who were asked to choose the most important value for Canadians 
and to indicate why this value was important to them and why they had selected this 
particular value (group affirmation condition), expressed greater shame over the 
mistreatment of and injustice towards Aboriginals, and they showed a greater tendency 
towards compensatory actions.  
 
3.3 Shame and Demographic Characteristics  
Research has shown that shame decreases from adolescence to middle age, and then 
increases into old age. In addition, wealthy individuals report feeling less shame than 
do less privileged individuals (Orth, Robins, & Soto, 2010). In fact, the experience of 
shame is very common among poor and working class individuals (Power, Cole, & 
Fredrickson, 2010). They may feel shame merely because of being poor, or because of 
being stigmatised for being poor. Social class also triggers shame, even for those who 
are educated and have a high status in society, but who emerge from a working class 
background (Brown, 2007).  
 Furthermore, women report more shame than men (M. Lewis, 1992; Orth et al., 
2010). It sometimes seems that, regardless of gender, those individuals with a feminine 
gender role feel a higher level of shame than do those with a masculine gender role 
(Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 2005). Gross and Hansen (2000) proposed that investment 
in relatedness, which refers to valuing close personal relationships with others, to be 
connected, loved and cared for, mediates the relationship between gender and shame. 
They found that after controlling for relatedness, the effect of gender on shame 
disappeared.  
 Women are socialised differently from men (M. Lewis, 1992). For instance, 
Brown (2012) asserted that her qualitative work on shame and vulnerability implicated 
that one of the main triggers of shame for women is their appearance, while for men it 
is their weakness/power. Men do not want to be viewed as weak or ‚girly‛. This is 
exactly what culture imposes and the media promotes an extensive focus on women’s 
appearance and men’s masculinity. 
 Objectification theory proposes that self-objectification, seeing oneself as an 
object and putting a high value on one’s appearance, increases the feeling of shame 
about one’s body (Grabe, Hyde, & Lindberg, 2007; Tiggemann & Boundy, 2008). Even a 
compliment about one’s appearance increases body shame among those who are high 
in self-objectification (Tiggemann & Boundy, 2008). Specifically, in the current 
atmosphere in which culture is highly appearance-oriented, sexual objectification often 
targets and affects women more than it does men, forces girls and women to see 
themselves as objects, and to evaluate their value based on their physical attributes or 
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appearance (Roberts & Goldenberg, 2007). In media and culture, women’s appearance 
has a far greater value than other characteristics (Sanftner & Tantillo, 2011), and since 
the idealised appearance and body are impossible to attain, and standards are 
extremely narrow and rigorous (young, slim, white and so on), women are more prone 
to experience bodily shame than men, and often tend to be judged and treated 
negatively in social situations, such as at school and at work, merely because of their 
appearance, even though this is irrelevant to their qualifications, experience, and 
performance (Roberts & Goldenberg, 2007).  
 Thus, it can be said that culture and society put a lot of pressure on women with 
regard to their appearance, age, and body. As a result, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that these extra pressures contribute to the development of poor self-image, shame, and 
self-esteem. For example, a recent report in England indicated that 18% of girls aged 10 
to 13 were unhappy with their appearance, in comparison to 9% of boys (Lusher, 2014). 
More importantly, this survey found that the way in which girls think about their 
appearance and looks was perhaps a main contributor to the reduced wellbeing and 
lower life satisfaction that was seen in girls.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper explored the concept of shame and its characteristics and nature. The first 
section argued that shame is one of the self-conscious emotions; it starts to emerge 
around 18-24 months. In shame, there is a feeling of inadequacy, unworthiness, and 
inferiority. Shame can occur when someone makes internal, stable, uncontrollable, and 
global attributions for a negative incident or when they feel they have a lower status in 
relation to others. In the second section, there was analysis of the differences between 
shame and similar constructs and how shame can be distinguished from guilt, 
embarrassment, self-esteem, shyness, and humiliation. In the last section, I described 
how shame is perceived in collectivist and individualist cultures. Previous research 
indicates that shame can be vicarious and elicited as a result of particular group 
membership. Women and people from underprivileged backgrounds, minorities, and 
working class people are more prone to experience shame. It is necessary to further 
study shame and expand our knowledge in this area in order to deal with it better and 
manage it more appropriately.  
 
 
References 
 
Allan, S., Gilbert, P., & Goss, K. (1994). An exploration of shame measures: II: 
Psychopathology. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 719–722. 
Andrews, B. (1995). Bodily shame as a mediator between abusive experiences and 
depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 277–285. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          99 
Andrews, B. (1998). Methodological and definitional issues in shame research. In P. 
Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and 
culture (pp. 39-54). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Andrews, B. (2002). Body shame and abuse in childhood. In P. Gilbert & J.N.V. Miles 
(Eds). Body shame: Conceptualisation, research and treatment (pp. 256-266). Hove: 
Brunner-Routledge. 
Bagozzi, R. P., Verbeke, W., & Gavino, J. C. (2003). Culture moderates the self-
regulation of shame and its effects on performance: The case of salespersons in 
the Netherlands and the Philippines. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 219-233. 
Barrett, K. C., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Cole, P.M. (1993). Avoiders versus amenders - 
Implications for the investigation of guilt and shame during toddlerhood? 
Cognition and Emotion, 7, 481-505. 
Benetti-McQuoid, J., & Bursik, K. (2005). Individual differences in experiences of and 
responses to guilt and shame: Examining the lenses of gender and gender 
role. Sex Roles, 53, 133-142. 
Bennett, D. S., Sullivan, M. W., & Lewis, M. (2005). Young children’s adjustment as a 
function of maltreatment, shame, and anger. Child Maltreatment, 4, 311-323.  
Birchwood, M., Trower, P., Brunet, K., Gilbert, P., Iqbal, Z., & Jackson, C. (2006). Social 
anxiety and shame of psychosis: A study in first episode psychosis. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 45, 1025-1037.  
Blum, A. (2008). Shame and guilt, misconceptions and controversies: A critical review of 
the literature. Traumatology, 14, 3 91-102.  
Bowlby, J. (1983). Attachment. Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. New York: Basic Books. 
Brown, B. (2010). The gifts of imperfection: Let go of who you think you're supposed to be and 
embrace who you are. Center City, MN: Hazelden. 
Brown, B. (2012). Daring greatly: How the courage to be vulnerable transforms the way we 
live, love, parent, and lead. New York City, NY: Gotham 
Brown, J. D., & Marshall, M. A. (2001). Self-esteem and emotion: Some thoughts about 
feelings. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 575–584. 
Clark, S. E., & Symons, D. K. (2000). A longitudinal study of Q-sort attachment security 
and self-processes at age 5. Infant and Child Development, 9, 91–104. 
Cohen, D., Vandello, J. A., & Rantilla, A. K. (1998). The sacred and the social: Honor and 
violence in cultural context. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: 
Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 261-282). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Colman, R. A., & Thompson, R. A. (2002). Attachment security and the problem-solving 
behaviors of mothers and children. Merrill–Palmer Quarterly, 48, 337–359. 
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner's. 
Corrigan, P. W., Watson, A. C., & Miller, F. E. (2006). Blame, shame, and contamination: 
The impact of mental illness and drug dependence stigma of family members. 
Journal of Family Psychology, 20, 239-246. 
Crozier, W. R. (2014). Differentiating shame from embarrassment. Emotion Review, 6, 
269-276. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          100 
Crystal, D. S., Parrot, W. G., Okazaki, Y., & Watanabe, H. (2001). Examining relations 
between shame and personality among university students in the United States 
and Japan: A developmental perspective. International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 25, 113-123. 
Dickerson, S. S., Gable, S. L., Irwin, M. R., Aziz, N., & Kemeny, M. E. (2009). Social-
evaluative threat and proinflammatory cytokine regulation: An experimental 
laboratory investigation. Psychological Science, 20, 1237-44. 
Dickerson, S. S., Gruenewald, T. L., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). When the social self is 
threatened: Shame, physiology, and health. Journal of Personality, 72, 1191-1216. 
Dickerson, S. S., Kemeny, M. E., Aziz, N., Kim, K. H., & Fahey, J. L. (2004). 
Immunological effects of induced shame and guilt. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66, 
124-131. 
Dresler-Hawke, E., & Liu, J. H. (2006). Collective shame and the positioning of German 
national identity. Psicologia Politica, 32, 131-153.  
Edelstein, R. S., & Shaver, P. R. (2007). A cross-cultural examination of lexical studies of 
self-conscious emotions. In J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds), The 
self-conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp. 194-208). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Feiring, C., Taska, L., & Lewis, M. (2002). Adjustment following sexual abuse discovery: 
The role of shame and attributional style. Developmental Psychology, 38, 79-92. 
Ferguson, T. J., & Stegge, H. (1995). Emotional states and traits in children: The case of 
guilt and shame. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: 
The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 174–197). New York: 
Guilford. 
Fischer, A. H., Manstead, A. S. R., & Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M. (1999). The role of 
honor-related versus individualistic values in conceptualizing pride, shame and 
anger: Spanish and Dutch cultural prototypes. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 149-179. 
Gilbert, P. (1998). What is shame? Some core issues and controversies. In P. Gilbert & B. 
Andrews (Eds.), Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 3–
38). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Gilbert, P. (2000). The relationship of shame, social anxiety and depression: The role of 
the evaluation of social rank. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 7, 174 –189. 
Gilbert, P. (2002). Body shame: A biopsychosocial conceptualisation and overview with 
treatment implication. In P. Gilbert & J. N. V. Miles (Eds.). Body shame: 
Conceptualisation, research and treatment (pp. 3-54). Hove: Brunner-Routledge.  
Gilbert, P. (2011). Shame in psychotherapy and the role of compassion focused therapy. 
In R.L. Dearing & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Shame in the therapy hour (pp. 325-354). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Gilbert, P., & McGuire, M. T. (1998). Shame, status, and social roles: Psychobiology and 
evolution. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: Interpersonal behavior, 
psychopathology, and culture (pp. 99 –125). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          101 
Gilbert, P., & Miles, J. N. V. (2000). Sensitivity to social put-down: Its relationship to 
perceptions of social rank, shame, social anxiety, depression, anger and self– 
other blame. Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 757–774. 
Gilbert, P., Allan, S., & Goss, K. (1996). Parental representations, shame, interpersonal 
problems, and vulnerability to psychopathology. Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 3, 23-34. 
Goss, K., Gilbert, P., & Allan, S. (1994). An exploration of shame measures: I. The Other 
as Shamer Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 713–717. 
Grabe, S., Hyde, J. S., & Lindberg, S. M. (2007). Body objectification and depression in 
adolescents: The role of gender, shame, and rumination. Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, 31, 164-175. 
Greenwald, D. F., & Harder, D. W. (1998). Domains of shame: Evolutionary, cultural 
and psychotherapeutic aspects. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: 
Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 225–245). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Greenwald, D. F., & Harder, D. W. (1998). Domains of shame: Evolutionary, cultural 
and psychotherapeutic aspects. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: 
Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 225–245). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Griffin, S. (1995). A cognitive-developmental analysis of pride, shame, and 
embarrassment in middle childhood. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-
conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 219–
236). New York: Guilford. 
Gross, C. A., & Hansen, N. E. (2000). Clarifying the experience of shame: The role of 
attachment style, gender, and investment in relatedness. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 28, 897-907. 
Gruenewald, T. L., Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2007). A social function for the 
self-conscious emotions: Social self-preservation theory. In J. Tracy, R. Robins, & 
J. Tangney (Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp. 68-87). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Gunn, G. R., & Wilson, A. E. (2011). Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: The 
effect of group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory 
attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1474-1487. 
Harper, J. M. (2011). Regulating and coping with shame. In R. Trnka, K. Balcar, & M. 
Kuska (Eds.), Re-constructing emotional spaces: From experience to regulation (pp. 
189–206). Prague, CZ: Prague College of Psychosocial Studies Press. 
Heerey, E. A., Keltner, D., & Capps, L. M. (2003). Making sense of self-conscious 
emotion: Linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism. Emotion, 
3, 394–400. 
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological 
Review, 94, 319-340. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          102 
Higgins, E. T., Bond, R. N., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1986). Self-discrepancies and 
emotional vulnerability: How magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy 
influence affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 5–15. 
Higgins, E. T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). Self-concept discrepancy theory: A 
psychological model for distinguishing among different aspects of depression 
and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3, 51-76. 
Hogg, M. A. & Vaughan, G. M. (2008). Social psychology. Essex, England: Pearson 
Education Limited.  
Johns, M., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2005). Ashamed to be an American? The role of 
identification in predicting vicarious shame for Anti-Arab prejudice after 9-
11. Self and Identity, 4, 331-348. 
Joireman, J. (2004). Empathy and the self-absorption paradox II: Self-rumination and 
self-reflection as mediators between shame, guilt, and empathy. Self and Identity, 
3, 225-238. 
Kelley, S. A., Brownell, C. A., & Campbell, S. B. (2000). Mastery motivation and self-
evaluative affect in toddlers: Longitudinal relations with maternal behavior. 
Child Development, 71, 1061–1071. 
Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment, 
shame, and guilt: A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of 
emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 10, 155–172. 
Keltner, D., & Harker, L. (1998). The forms and functions of the nonverbal signal of 
shame. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: Interpersonal behavior, 
psychopathology, and culture (pp. 78–98). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Kemeny, M. E., Gruenewald, T. L., & Dickerson, S. S. (2004). Shame as the emotional 
response to threat to the social self: Implications for behaviour, physiology, and 
health. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 153-160.  
Kim, S., Thibodeau, R., & Jorgensen, R. S. (2011). Shame, guilt, and depressive 
symptoms: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 68-96.  
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Matsumoto, H. (1995). A cultural perspective on self-
conscious emotions. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious 
emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp.439–464). New 
York: Guilford. 
Klein, D. C. (1991). The humiliation dynamic: An overview. The Journal of Primary 
Prevention, 12, 93–121. 
Lagattuta, K. H., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). The development of self-conscious 
emotions: Cognitive processes and social influences. In J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, 
& J. P. Tangney (Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp. 91-113). 
New York: Guilford. 
Leary, M. R. (2007a). How the self-became involved in affective experience: Three 
sources of self-reflective emotions. In J. Tracy., R. Robins, & J. Tangney 
(Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp. 38-52). New York: 
Guilford. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          103 
Leeming, D., & Boyle, M. (2004). Shame as a social phenomenon: A critical analysis of 
the concept of dispositional shame. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research 
& Practice, 77, 375-396. 
Lewis, M. (1995). Embarrassment: The emotion of self-exposure and evaluation. In J. P. 
Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, 
guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 198–218). New York: Guilford. 
Lewis, M. (1998). Shame and stigma. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame: 
Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 126–140). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, M. (2000). Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In 
M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 623–
636). New York: Guilford. 
Lewis, M. (2000). Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In 
M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 623–
636). New York: Guilford. 
Lewis, M. (2003). The role of the self in shame. Social Research, 70, 1181-1204. 
Lewis, M. (2003). The role of the self in shame. Social Research, 70, 1181-1204. 
Lewis, M. (2007). Self-conscious emotional development. In J. L. Tracy, R.W. Robins, & 
J. P. Tangney (Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp. 134-149). 
New York: Guilford. 
Lewis, M., & Ramsay, D. (2002). Cortisol response to embarrassment and shame. Child 
Development, 73, 1034-1045. 
Lewis, M., Alessandri, S., & Sullivan, M. W. (1992). Differences in shame and pride as a 
function of children’s gender and task difficulty. Child Development, 63, 630–638. 
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Universities Press. 
Lewis, M. (1992). Shame: The exposed self. New York: Free Press.  
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., & Spanovic, M. (2007). Group-conscious emotions: The 
implications of others’ wrongdoings for identity and relationships. In J. L. Tracy, 
R.W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: Theory and 
Research (pp. 351-370). New York: NY: Guilford Press. 
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M., & Ames, D. R. (2005). Vicarious shame 
and guilt. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 8, 145-157. 
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M., & Ames, D. R. (2005). Vicarious shame 
and guilt. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 8, 145-157. 
Lindisfarne, N. (1998). Gender, shame, and culture: An anthropological perspective. In 
P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds), Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and 
culture (pp. 246-260). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lindsay-Hartz, J. (1984). Contrasting experiences of shame and guilt. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 27, 689 –704.  
Lindsay-Hartz, J., de Rivera, J. H., Mascolo, M. F. (1995). Differentiating guilt and shame 
and their effects on motivation. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-
conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp.274–
300). New York: Guilford. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          104 
Lusher, A. (2014). Report finds English children among the unhappiest in world. The 
Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/. 
Mills, R. (2005). Taking stock of the developmental literature on shame. Developmental 
Review, 25, 26–63. 
Mosher, D. L., & White, B. B. (1981). On differentiating shame and shyness. Motivation 
and Emotion, 5, 61-74. 
Niedenthal, P., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). "If only I weren't" versus "If only I 
hadn't": Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 585-595. 
Olthof, T., Ferguson, T. J., Bloemers, E., & Deij, M. (2004). Morality- and identity-related 
antecedents of children’s guilt and shame attributions in events involving 
physical illness. Cognition and Emotion, 18, 383–404. 
Orth, U., Robins, R. W., & Soto, C. J. (2010). Tracking the trajectory of shame, guilt, and 
pride across the life span. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 1061-
1071.  
Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). What's basic about basic emotions? Psychological 
Review, 97, 315-331. 
Parker, S., & Thomas, R. (2009). Psychological differences in shame vs. guilt: 
Implications for mental health counsellors. Journal of Mental Health Counselling, 
31, 213-223.  
Pettersen, K. T. (2009). An exploration into the concept and phenomenon of shame within the 
context of child sexual abuse. (Unpublished doctoral thesis), Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway.  
Power, C.A., Cole, E. R., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Poor women and the expression of 
shame and anger: The price of breaking social class feeling rules. Feminism & 
Psychology, 21, 179-197.  
Roberts, T. A., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2007). Wrestling with nature: An existential 
perspective on the body and gender in self-conscious emotions. In J. Tracy, R. 
Robins, & J. Tangney (Eds.), The self-conscious emotions: theory and research (pp. 
389-406). New York: Guilford Press. 
Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2000). The role of 
honor-related values in the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, 
shame and anger: Spain and the Netherlands compared. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 833-844. 
Rozin, P. (2003). Five potential principles for understanding cultural differences in 
relation to individual differences. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 273–283. 
Rusch, N., Lieb, K., Gottler, I., Hermann, C., Schramm, E., Richter, H., . . . Bohus, M. 
(2007). Shame and implicit self-concept in women with borderline personality 
disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 500-8. 
Sabini, J., Garvey, B., & Hall, A. L. (2001). Shame and embarrassment revisited. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 104–117. 
Sanftner, J. L., & Tantillo, M. (2011). Body image and eating disorders: A compelling 
source of shame for women. In R. Dearing & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Shame in the 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          105 
therapy hour (pp. 277-303). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association. 
Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. Sociological Theory, 
18, 84–99.  
Shame (n.d.). In Oxford English dictionary. Retrieved from 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/177406?rskey=5WStZX&result=1&isAdvanced=
false  
Sheikh, S. & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2010). The should and should nots of moral emotions: A 
self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 36, 213-224. 
Shrauger, J. S., & Schoeneman, T. J. (1979). Symbolic interactionist view of self-concept: 
Through the glass darkly. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 549-573. 
Smith, R. H., Webster, M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public 
exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83, 138-159.  
Stipek, D. (1995). The development of pride and shame in toddlers. In J. P. Tangney & 
K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride 
(pp. 237-252). New York: Guilford. 
Tangney, J. P. (1992). Situational determinants of shame and guilt in young adulthood. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 199-206. 
Tangney, J. P. (1995). Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships. In J. P. Tangney & 
K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and pride (pp.114–143). New York: Guilford. 
Tangney, J. P. (1996). Conceptual and methodological issues in the assessment of shame 
and guilt. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 741-754. 
Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). Shame and guilt. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 
1256 -1269. 
Tangney, J. P., Niedenthal, P. M., Covert, M. V., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). Are shame and 
guilt related to distinct self-discrepancies? A test of Higgins’ (1978) hypothesis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 256-268.  
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P. E., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Proneness of shame, proneness to 
guilt, and psychopathology. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 469-478. 
Tangney, J., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. (2007). Moral emotions, moral cognitions, and 
moral behavior. Annual Review, 58, 345-372. 
Tantam, D. (1998). The emotional disorders of shame. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), 
Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture (pp. 161-176). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Thompson, R. A. (2006). The development of the person: Social understanding, 
relationships, self, conscience. In W. Damon & R.M. Lerner (Eds.) & N. Eisenberg 
(Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality 
development (6th ed., pp. 24–98). New York: Wiley. 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          106 
Tiggemann, M., & Boundy, M. (2008). Effect of environment and appearance 
compliment on college women’s self-objectification, mood, body shame, and 
cognitive performance. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 32, 399-405.  
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A 
theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 103–125. 
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2007b). The self in self-conscious emotions: A cognitive 
appraisal approach. In J. L. Tracy, R.W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.). The self-
conscious emotions: Theory and research (pp.3-20). New York, NY: Guilford.  
Turner, J. E. (2014). Researching state shame with the experiential shame scale. The 
Journal of Psychology, 148, 577-601. 
Vikan, A.,  Hassel, A. M.,  Rugset, A.,  Johansen, H. E., &  Moen, T. (2010). A test of 
shame in outpatients with emotional disorder. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 64, 
196-202.  
Wallbott, H. G., & Scherer K. R. (1989). Assessing emotion by questionnaire. In R. 
Plutchik & H. Kellerman  (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, research, and experience. Vol. 4. 
The measurement of emotion (pp. 55-82). New York: Academic Press. 
Wallbott, H. G., & Scherer K. R. (1995). Cultural determinants in experiencing shame 
and guilt. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions: The 
psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp.465–487). New York: 
Guilford. 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attribution theory of achievement motivation and 
emotion. Psychological Review, 92, 548–73. 
Wicker, E.W., Payne, G. C., & Morgan, R. D. (1983). Participant descriptions of guilt and 
shame. Motivation and Emotion, 7, 25-39. 
Wong, Y. & Tsai, J. L. (2007). Cultural models of shame and guilt. In J. Tracy, R. Robins 
& J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self-conscious emotions, (pp.210-223). New York, 
NY: Guilford Press.  
Wong, Y. & Tsai, J. L. (2007). Cultural models of shame and guilt. In J. Tracy, R. Robins 
& J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self-conscious emotions, (pp.210-223). New York, 
NY: Guilford Press.  
Yi, S. & Baumgartner, H. (2011). Coping with guilt and shame in the impulse buying 
context. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32, 458-467. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neda Sedighimornani   
SHAME AND ITS FEATURES: UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME 
 
European Journal of Social Sciences Studies - Volume 3 │ Issue 3 │ 2018                                                                          107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creative Commons licensing terms 
Author(s) will retain the copyright of their published articles agreeing that a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) terms 
will be applied to their work. Under the terms of this license, no permission is required from the author(s) or publisher for members of the community 
to copy, distribute, transmit or adapt the article content, providing a proper, prominent and unambiguous attribution to the authors in a manner that 
makes clear that the materials are being reused under permission of a Creative Commons License. Views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this 
research article are views, opinions and conclusions of the author(s). Open Access Publishing Group and European Journal of Social Sciences Studies 
shall not be responsible or answerable for any loss, damage or liability caused in relation to/arising out of conflicts of interest, copyright violations and 
inappropriate or inaccurate use of any kind content related or integrated into the research work. All the published works are meeting the Open Access 
Publishing requirements and can be freely accessed, shared, modified, distributed and used in educational, commercial and non-commercial purposes 
under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). 
